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'RQ¶WSXWDOO\RXUspeech-acts in one basket: situating animal activism in the 
deliberative system 
Abstract 
In this article I offer deliberative systems as a normative and evaluative approach through 
ZKLFK WR DSSUDLVH W\SLFDOO\ µQRQ-GHOLEHUDWLYH¶ DQLPDO DFWLYLVP Although such actions can 
contribute to inclusive deliberation through the political representation of animals, I caution 
against an over-reliance on such tactics and interrogate the claim that non-deliberative tactics 
are essential ingredients for prompting the reflection and reconsideration that animal rights 
philosophy demands. Instead, non-deliberative activism may serve not only to undermine 
further deliberation but to actually jeopardise animal protection goals. 
Keywords: deliberative democracy, deliberative system, animal rights, activism 
Introduction 
Recent contributions to the debate on animal rights and deliberative democracy have 
primarily illuminated incompatibilities between the two.1 Thus far however, scholars have 
failed to consider deliberative systems as a normative and evaluative framework through 
which to assess animal activism. I argue that deliberative systems offers valuable insight into 
the role of non-deliberative approaches that animal activists frequently adopt. It offers an 
attractive normative justification for the use of non-deliberative acts on the basis of their 
contribution to inclusive deliberation and the representation of animals. The strength of the 
systemic approach also evaluative. I conclude by suggesting that although non-deliberative 
actions can enhance inclusive deliberation, an over-reliance on them may serve to undermine 
both deliberative and animal protection goals. This is particularly relevant when it comes to 
WUDQVPLWWLQJDQLPDODFWLYLVWV¶PHVVDJHVWRGHFLVLRQ-makers.  
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The role of activism in deliberative democracy has been subject to debate amongst 
deliberative theorists for some time. A number of scholars have sought to demonstrate how 
non-deliberative politics including social movements, protest and disruption and everyday 
talk can harbour deliberative potential. 2  Such potential has taken varying forms: from 
deliberative organisation within movements themselves, to the impact of activism on public 
deliberation itself. The systemic turn in deliberative democracy provides theorists with a 
conceptual framework to situate and evaluate non-deliberative acts. However as John Hadley 
points out, the precise implications of admitting non-deliberative actions are somewhat 
opaque and vague3 - ZKLFKDFWLRQVVKRXOGEHµDOORZHG¶"+RZH[DFWO\GR WKH\FRQWULEXWHWR
further deliberaWLRQ" +DGOH\¶V FRQFHUQ LV WDNHQ IXUWKHU E\ 2ZHQ DQG 6PLWK who caution 
deliberative systems scholars not to get too carried away in their endorsement of non-
deliberative actions. In particular, they warn against admitting non-deliberative practices 
simply in virtue of their contribution to systemic quality. Instead, they suggest that 
Any such account should indicate how to evaluate the trade-off between the 
deliberative quality of the parts and of the system as a whole, and do so by 
reference to the deliberative democratic ideal. It should suggest ways of 
assessing both the value of non-deliberative practices and any deliberative 
wrongs they may involve.4 
In other words, although non-deliberative acts may enhance overall systemic deliberation, 
this does not justify deliberative wrongs. Although there are compelling reasons to support 
the deployment of disruptive animal activism, latent deliberative potential is not realised 
uniformly across the deliberative system. Instead, the benefits or otherwise of non-
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4
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deliberative tactics will vary in different communicative sites, and may not provide a clear 
balance sheet.  
The article is divided into three sections. I first outline the deliberative systems approach and 
'U\]HN¶Vaccount of the deliberative system as a framework through which to evaluate the 
role of animal activism, as well as a normative justification for the use of non-deliberative 
actions. 5  I go on to outline Humphrey and Stears¶ FULWLTXH RI GHOLEHUDWLYH GHPRFUDF\¶V
apparent incompatibility with animal rights activism. In particular, I refute their claim that 
deliberative democracy restricts animal activism and instead argue that inclusive, authentic 
and consequential deliberation is conducive to animal protection goals.6 In the second section, 
I consider WKH UROH RI µFRVW-OHY\LQJ¶ LQ WKH GHOLEHUDWLYH V\VWHP IROORZLQJ Humphrey and 
6WHDUV¶RZQGHILQLWLRQRIFRVW-OHY\LQJDVSROLWLFDODFWLRQµSUHPLVHGRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKH
incentive structures for particular courses of action can be directly altered by a politically 
HQJDJHGJURXSRIFLWL]HQVLIWKRVHFLWL]HQVWDUJHWWKHLUEHKDYLRXUVLQWKHULJKWVRUWRIZD\¶.7 In 
the third section I discuss the exaggeration of moral disagreement ± when activists use moral 
shock tactics to distance themselves from their adversaries and deliberately polarise debate. 
Humphrey and Stears suggest that this shock is necessary to induce reflection and change 
behaviour. Whilst I agree with the premise that the exaggeration of moral disagreement is 
intended to persuade, it does not follow that it is necessarily effective. From a systemic 
perspective, the risks of alienating or desensitising  certain audiences must be considered in 
any appraisal of animal activism and deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative Systems 
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Deliberative Democratic theory has undergone a number of well-known µWXUQV¶ since its 
inception.8 Nonetheless the core of deliberative democracy remains a theory of democracy 
whereby deliberation ± a particular type of communication ± is the central tenet of democratic 
decision-making. Political decisions should be made through a process of deliberation. 
Legitimacy is derived from the extent to which affected interests have been able to participate 
in this deliberative process.9 Authentic deliberation is communication defined by truthfulness, 
mutual respect, non-coercive persuasion, efforts to be constructive in finding acceptable 
outcomes, prioritisation of generalizable interests and reflexivity.10 In addition to the core 
features of authentic deliberation, all those affected by a collective decision must be included 
in some way. The most recent development in the field is the systemic turn, conceptualised 
by Mansbridge as a set of communicative sites interacting and having some effect on each 
other and an overall outcome: 
Through talk among formal and informal representatives in designated public 
forums, talk back and forth between constituents and elected representatives or 
other representatives in politically oriented organizations, talk in the media, talk 
amongst political activists, and everyday talk in formally private spaces about 
WKLQJV WKHSXEOLFRXJKW WRGLVFXVV«WKH IXOOGHOLEHUDWLYH V\VWHP encompasses all 
these strands.11 
Once evaluation of deliberative quality moves to a systemic level, it is no longer necessary to 
achieve the highest procedural quality in a single deliberative moment or forum, because 
overall deliberative capacity is also evaluated.12 This is not to suggest that evaluation of 
different components is done away with altogether, as Owen and Smith fear. It simply 
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provides a cohesive framework through which to assess communication across public and 
private, formal and informal settings. As Mansbridge et al point out: 
Even if a legislature has a high quality and ZHOO LQIRUPHG GHEDWH«the 
deliberation looks less adequate in the context of a system that permits highly 
unequal campaign contributions RU HQDEOHV WKH PHGLD WR IUDPH WKH LVVXH«$
systemic approach allows us to see more clearly where a system might be 
improved, and recommend institutions or other innovations that could supplement 
the system in areas of weakness.13 
John Dryzek has provided the most empirically feasible conception of the deliberative system 
in the emerging literature, and it is this model that I use to consider the role of animal 
DFWLYLVP'U\]HN¶VV\VWHPGHVFULEHVWKHVHWWLQJV LQZKLFKGLIIHUHQWGHOLEHUDWLYHIHDWXUHVDUH
sought: 
x Private Sphere: informal conversations usually be inaccessible as they take place 
between friends, family or colleagues in private locations.14  
x Public Space: where communication is openly accessible. Separate from formal 
decision-making arenas, public space can include communication between and 
amongst members of the public, activists or the media.  
x Empowered Space: settings where collective decisions are made - including 
governments, networks, or actors such as advisory groups, experts, cross party groups 
and committees. 
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 Mansbridge et al 2012: 3-4, emphasis added. 
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x Transmission: the mechanisms by which messages are transmitted across different 
sites; including campaigns by activist groups, media reporting or even voting 
behaviour. 
x Accountability: the ways in which decision-makers provide an explanation of their 
actions to the public.  
x Meta-deliberation: the ability of the entire system to reflect on itself and self-rectify.  
x Decisiveness: the extent to which deliberation or communication in the rest of the 
system actually impacts on substantive outcomes.15  
The deliberative system is evaluated against the criteria of inclusivity, authenticity and 
consequentiality.16 In a healthy deliberative system, authenticity is sought in all settings. 
Authenticity refers to the standard features of deliberative communication already outlined. 
Inclusivity ± the inclusion of affected interests ± should be present in some sense in all 
settings but is primarily sought in public space, since this is where communication is 
unconstrained and ideally anyone can participate. A growing number of deliberative scholars 
suggest that it is the distillation and contestation of different viewpoints that constitutes a 
healthy deliberative public space.17 This position emphasises the importance of challenging 
dominant narratives and crystallising new and emerging discourses ± as opposed to the 
stifling effect that Humphrey and Stears imagine.18 Overall system health remains contingent 
on whether the inclusive constellation of discourses is successfully transmitted through to 
decision-making arenas in empowered space.  
Here I emphasise three sites: public space, empowered space and transmission. These are the 
primary spaces in which animal activism is prominent; much of the movement has focussed 
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on raising public awareness of animal abuse and trying to persuade members of the public to 
adjust their behaviour accordingly. Animal protection organisations also lobby government 
and push for policy and legislative changes to tip the scales in favour of animals ± therefore 
many of their tactics are transmission mechanisms, transmitting their messages directly to 
decision-makers in empowered space. These spaces also see a myriad of communication 
flowing through. Animal protectionists transmit their claims in several different directions: 
toward the public, to decision-makers and animal industries. The flow does not stop there; 
messages may be filtered by media outlets, countered by industry lobbyists, rejected, 
accepted or transformed by publics and politicians. It is only from a systemic vantage point 
WKDWZHFDQDSSUHFLDWHWKHGLVFUHWHZD\VLQZKLFKDQLPDODGYRFDWHV¶PHVVDJHVDUHLQWHUSUHWHG
or received in different communicative sites. 
There remains the question Hadley raises in relation to animal activism ± does this imply an 
µDQ\WKLQJ JRHV¶ DSSURDFK ZKHUHE\ all non-deliberative acts should be permitted if they 
contribute to further deliberative capacity further down the line?19 This is at least partly 
addressed in the system by considering the final criterion, consequentiality. Consequentiality 
is ultimately seen in the decisions that emerge from empowered space, and is seen in the 
extent to which deliberation in various parts of the system has an effect on those decisions. 
Any evaluation of animal activism in the deliberative system must therefore consider not only 
its contribution to inclusivity and authentic deliberation, but also whether that ultimately has 
any discernible impact on concomitant decisions. However, that is not say that violence, 
threats and property damage are acceptable from a consequentialist perspective either ± we 
also have to take into account the negative impact of such activities on, for example, public 
perception of animal activism and reputational damage to the movement as a whole. Here 
activists themselves need to be reflexive and able to reflect on their own actions and tactics 
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and weigh up the purported benefits or otherwise.20 However, we can only weigh up such 
deliberative potentials from a systemic rather than linear viewpoint. Rather than focussing on 
WKH HIIHFW RQ LQGLYLGXDO DFWLRQV µIXUWKHU GRZQ WKH OLQH¶ DFWLYLVWV QHHG WR FRQVLGHU WKH
multifarious and discrete impacts that their actions have in different parts of the deliberative 
system.  
Animal Activism and Deliberative Democracy 
+XPSKUH\ DQG 6WHDUV¶ argue that the behavioural and procedural restrictions of orthodox 
deliberative democracy serve to undermine the political equality of animal activists and stifle 
the radical innovation needed to awaken people to the animal rights position. I fundamentally 
disagree with them: inclusive, authentic and consequential deliberation can facilitate animal 
protection goals.  
Humphrey and Stears sketch out two categories of non-deliberation action employed by 
animal rights activists. Cost-levying broadly refers to any action where an activist seeks to 
impose some cost on those who participate in or support animal abuse. Cost-levying ranges 
from the relatively benign (public boycotting of a company involved in animal testing) to 
beyond the boundaries of legal and ethical acceptability (vandalism, breaking and entering, 
intimidation). As Humphrey and Stears justifiably point out, such activities are classed as 
non-deliberative since they involve coercion and force, rather than discursive engagement or 
persuasion. So far, so good. Cost-levying is not deliberative. This is not to say that cost-
levying does not have a place in the deliberative system ± but nonetheless such actions stand 
alone as non-deliberative.  
Humphrey and Stears go on to argue that any reasonable theory of democracy ought to make 
space for cost-levying tactics on the basis that they enhance the political equality of activists. 
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They suggest that activists are a small, marginalised group, Davids in comparison to the 
Goliaths of the animal industries they are fighting ± huge agribusinesses, pharmaceutical 
companies and so on. The use of cost-levying tactics is acceptable under some circumstances 
because  
«small, or relatively unpopular, groups of political activists must find ways of 
placing their issues on the political agenda; they must somehow find leverage 
out of their otherwise uninfluential political position. 21 
Again: so far, so good. In the deliberative system, cost-levying tactics may be justified on the 
basis that they enable animal activists to shoulder their way into the public eye and highlight 
issues that would otherwise remain hidden. ,W¶V fairly easy to see how they contribute to 
inclusivity in public space in this way. However, Humphrey and Stears go beyond this in 
their implications,  stating that activists employ cost-OHY\LQJWDFWLFVLQRUGHUWRµlead others at 
least to think seriously about their concerns, on this model by getting in the way of the 
normal day-to-day behaviour of a range of other citizens, unsettling their practices and thus 
waking them up to the protestoUV¶ H[LVWHQFHDQG WKHLUGHPDQGV¶.22 This suggests something 
much more substantial than simply getting onto the agenda; Humphrey and Stears suggest 
that cost-OHY\LQJLVHPSOR\HGLQRUGHUWRµNLFN-start the process of reconsideration¶.23 Despite 
the fact that they purport to be arguing against GHOLEHUDWLYHWKHRU\KHUH+XPSKUH\DQG6WHDUV¶
µSURFHVV RI UHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶ LV UHPDUNDEO\ VLPLODU WR WKH deliberative ideal of reflexivity, 
where people are prepared to reflect on their own positions and reconsider them in light of 
new information and alternative perspectives.24 The problem is that Humphrey and Stears 
elevate the capacity of cost-levying to meet the demands of inclusive and authentic 
                                                          
21
 Humphrey and Stears 2006: 406. 
22
 Ibid: 407. 
23
 Ibid: 407. 
24
 Eckersley 2004: 119 
10 
 
deliberation when they suggest that cost-levying is a persuasive device. In suggesting that 
cost-levying aims to persuade, they fail to appreciate the differentiated motivations of animal 
activists. Hadley points out that some animal activists take part in disruptive cost-levying 
activities with the relatively straightforward aim of saving animals.25 In cases such as these, it 
is far from clear whether the disruptive activity has the ultimate aim of dissuading 
protagonists to reconsider their behaviour in the way that Humphrey and Stears suggest. To 
be sure, direct action may result in such a level of disruption that the targeted activity is 
abandoned, but it does not necessarily follow that the costs imposed are sufficient or 
conducive to actually persuading people to reconsider future participation in the activity.  
Representing Animals in the Deliberative System 
If cost-levying is sometimes carried out without any intending to persuade, what is its 
deliberative potential? Hadley is somewhat dismissive, describing this kind of activism as 
µH[WUHPLVW¶DQG focusing his GLVFXVVLRQRQµPRGHUDWH¶DFWLYLVWV.26 I argue here that although 
the ODWWHU SDUW RI +XPSKUH\ DQG 6WHDUV¶ claim is questionable ± that cost-levying aims to 
persuade ± the initial statement that cost-levying helps get issues onto the agenda is worth 
exploring in further depth.  
Humphrey and Stears raise a valid point about the potential contribution that non-deliberative 
actions can make in providing a corrective to pre-existing structural inequality.27 Conversely, 
Hadley argues that animal advocates do not have their political equality undermined as 
Humphrey and Stears suggest, pointing out that µit is not as if animal rights advocates are 
being physically harmed or killed or denied DFKDQFHWRYRWHLQHOHFWLRQV¶28 Consequently, he 
goes on, the plight of animal advocates does not satisfy the gravity of injustice condition that 
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 Hadley 2015b: 14. 
26Ibid: 14. 
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 Eg. Young 2001. 
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 Hadley 2015a: 705. 
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would justify the use of direct action tactics29. However, neither Humphrey and Stears nor 
Hadley take into account the democratic credentials of animals themselves. 
Both recognise the moral justifications for non-deliberative action: Humphrey and Stears put 
IRUZDUG WKH µPRUDO XUJHQF\¶ and animal advocates¶ impatience with existing political 
processes; the scale and suffering of animal abuse is too morally pressing to wait.30 Similarly, 
Hadley recognises that that state of injustice may be grave for animals but denies that this in 
itself is justification for the use of violence, threats and property damage in the name of 
political equality of activists.31 But neither article considers animals in a truly democratic 
sense.  
If we take the all-affected principle of democracy seriously ± and many deliberative scholars 
do ± then all those who are affected by a political decision ought to be able to participate or 
be represented in the decision-making process. It is of course the endorsement of the all-
affected principle that makes deliberative democracy appear so promising to environmental 
and animal advocates. Under the all-affected rubric, it is easy to cede that animals should be 
included somehow in any deliberative process. From a democratic point of view, that animals 
are unable to participate renders them perhaps the ultimate marginalised group in our 
societies. But there is no theoretical barrier to including animals in democratic processes32. 
The all-affected principle offers a deliberative democratic justification for inclusivity. 
Furthermore, the premise of authentic GHOLEHUDWLRQ LV µWKDW all the views of participants are 
taken seriously and that everyone tries to empathise with the views of others¶.33 In other 
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 ,W¶VLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDW+DGOH\¶VIRFXVKHUHLVRQWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRIYLROHQWDFWLRQVLQSDUWLFXODU+RZHYHU
his point that animal advocates are not having their political equality undermined remains a valid point of 
contention regardless of the type of actions they undertake. 
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 Humphrey and Stears 2006: 416. 
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 Parry forthcoming. 
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words, animal perspectives should, according to deliberative procedure, be given serious 
consideration. 
5DWKHU WKDQ +XPSKUH\ DQG 6WHDUV¶ FRQFHUQ DERXW WKH political equality of activists, I shift 
focus to the political equality of animals themselves. This is not to claim that animals ought 
to be acknowledged as political equals to humans; whether animals can vote or not is clearly 
trivial. It is not trivial however, to talk of giving animals equal consideration to humans in 
the relevant forums. If we take seriously the democratic credentials of animals then in many 
cases it is clear that they are not given equal consideration in decision-making processes, 
meaning that their political equality is considerably undermined. This arguably does meet the 
gravity of injustice condition outlined by Hadley: they are µSK\VLFDOO\ KDUPHG RU NLOOHG¶
:KHUHDV+DGOH\DUJXHVWKDWµXQOLNHWKHFDVHRI5RVD3DUNVWKHODZGRHVQRWUHTXLUHDQLPDO
rights advocates to give up their seats at the front of a bus simply in virtue of having animal 
ULJKWV FRQYLFWLRQV¶, it is the case that animals are not given due legal, moral or political 
representation and consideration simply in virtue of them being nonhuman animals.34  
Authentic deliberation offers  promising conditions IRUWKHLQFOXVLRQRIDQLPDOVWKHµHQODUJHG
WKLQNLQJ¶35 that is required to enable the consideration of generalizable and common interests 
is conducive to considering seriously the plight of nonhuman animals. The potential offered 
by deliberative democracy provides a compelling reason for animal protectionists to pursue 
this approach: deliberative democracy offers a justification for representing animals in 
decision-making that does not rely on first principles as a foundation. As Cochrane et al point 
RXW WKLV HQDEOHV XV WR µUHWKLQN ZKDW ZH RZH WR DQLPDOV RQ WKH EDVLV RI SULQFLSOHV DQG
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 Hadley 2015a: 705 
35
 Eckersley 2004: 116 
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institutional arrangements that we already accept, rather than on the basis of controversial 
FODLPVDERXWDQLPDOV¶PRUDOZRUWK¶.36 
How exactly we might include animals in a meaningful political way is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but it is worth noting that I do consider human representation to be a necessary 
FRUROODU\,LPDJLQHDQLPDODGYRFDWHVDQGDFWLYLVWVDVVRPHWKLQJDNLQWR'REVRQ¶V vision of 
proxy representation for animals.37 In the deliberative system however, activist proxies do not 
sit in parliament but are self-appointed substantive representatives acting in every setting of 
the system and in particular in public space and transmission. This assumption is sensible; 
many animal protection organisations make representative claims on behalf of animals. A 
glance at the websites of some prominent animal protection organisations illustrates this: UK 
anti-hunting organisation Save Me Trust states on its home page that LWµJLYHVZLOGDQLPDOVD
YRLFH¶. Australian institute Voiceless recently introduced their µ9RLFHIRU$QLPDOV%LOO¶DVD
PHWKRG RI µgiving a legitiPDWH SROLWLFDO YRLFH WR DQLPDOV¶.38 Furthermore, I start from the 
somewhat cynical position that Humphrey and Stears also occupy: in a political system so 
skewed by an unequal distribution of power and the dominance of the animal use paradigm 
and industry, we need animal activists to act as proxy representatives. Animals need human 
representation in current political conditions. If animal activists can internalise and 
incorporate the interests of animals,39  then they may be, at this point in time, the most 
effective political representatives of animals that we have.  
If we accept that activists act as representatives of animals, we must take into consideration 
the marginalised space that animals themselves occupy as a further democratic justification 
for the acceptance of non-deliberative actions. One glaring example of animal representation 
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is the use of graphic imagery of animal suffering. The use of such images is non-deliberative 
in the sense that does not involve the deployment of reasoned argument, but instead relies on 
invoking a more visceral reaction in the audience of revulsion or horror. Images of animal 
suffering are a form of cost-levying because they imposes a kind of psychological cost on the 
viewer in an attempt to instigate behaviour change. As one anti-hunting campaign video asks 
of its audience, following some disturbing footageµCDQ¶WVWRPDFKWKLVFUXHOW\"7KHQGRQ¶W
vote for it!¶40 According to Humphrey and Stears, this is justified on the basis that it gives 
activists the grist they need to claw their way onto the political agenda. But graphic imagery 
can also be seen as enabling animals to get onto the agenda as well. Without representation, 
they may otherwise remain invisible. In the deliberative system, graphic images of animal 
suffering can contribute to inclusivity through the representation of animals. However, 
Humphrey and Stears also claim that exerting this psychological cost is essential in jolting 
SHRSOH RXW RI WKHLU µVWLFN\¶ FRJQLWLYH IUDPHV RI UHIHUHQFH DQG DUH WKXV YLWDO HOHPHQWV LQ
democratic debate.41  
Previous analyses of animal rights activism and deliberative democracy remain tied to the 
idea that in order to be considered deliberative, an action - deliberative or otherwise - is 
directly tied to its intended outcome: Humphrey and Stears define cost-levying activity as 
intending to instigate a change in behaviour '¶$UF\ VXJJHVWV WKDW QRQ-deliberative means 
can provide an impetus for future reason-based discussion.42 Conversely, Hadley questions 
how extreme forms of direct action such as threats and property damage could ever be 
justifiable and constitute µGHOLEHUDWLYHQHVV¶IXUWKHUGRZQWKHOLQH43 Empirically, it would be 
necessary to follow the impact of a single graphic image from T1 to T2 to evaluate whether it 
had in fact had the desired effect of getting people to change their behaviour. It is a mistake 
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to conceptualise the deliberative potential of non-deliberative actions in such a linear way. In 
reality, there is QRµIXUWKHUGRZQWKHOLQH¶EHFDXVHWKHLPSDFWRIHYHQDVLQJOHDFWLRQLVPXFK
more dispersed and nuanced than this. In the deliberative system, non-deliberative actions can 
be evaluated in a more holistic manner by asking not only if an action has the desired effect, 
EXWDOVRFRQVLGHULQJµKRZDQGXQGHUZKDWFRQGLWLRQV¶.44  
Cost-levying can contribute to inclusivity by making animal suffering visible. However, it 
does not necessarily follow that non-deliberative actions contribute significantly to the 
reflexivity needed for people to re-assess their behaviour regarding animals. Instead, non-
deliberative actions may have the undesirable effect of alienating an audience or reinforcing 
their original perspective and undermining reflexive capacity. However, such actions will 
have varying effects in different sites in the deliberative system: the boycotting of a company 
that tests on animals may resonate well with consumers and ignite public interest, for 
example, but may not make a persuasive in empowered space. In the ideal situation, an 
incensed public reaction ensures that decision-makers receive and respond to their concerns. 
But this situation does not really exist; it is an assumption that has underpinned the 
movement for almost 50 years and it has quite VLPSO\µIDLOHG WRGHOLYHUPHDQLQJIXODQLPDO
protection¶. 45 Thus whilst non-deliberative actions make an important contribution to 
inclusive deliberation, animal activists would do well to avoid an over-reliance on such 
tactics at the expense of more deliberative approaches and to deploy them judiciously.  
The µexaggeration of moral disagreement¶ as Humphrey and Stears define it46 is a form of 
polarising rhetoric employed by animal activists that seeks to emphasise the moral distance 
                                                          
44
 Boswell et al forthcoming: 6. 
45
 Roberts 2015.  
46
 This phrase is Humphrey anG6WHDUV¶RZQWKHTXHVWLRQof whether animal activists are in fact exaggerating 
moral disagreement is not discussed here. 
16 
 
between their position and purported adversary.47 This is juxtaposed to communicating their 
arguments in terms that interlocutors can agree with as in *XWWPDQ DQG 7KRPSVRQ¶s 
µHFRQRP\RIPRUDOGLVDJUHHPHQW¶.48 
[animal activists] tend to employ a range of rhetorical strategies that would not 
endear them to deliberative democrats. Most notably, they are often to be found 
dramatically maximizing the differences between their position and the position 
of their rivals. They do not seek compromise or agreement nor do they even 
often outline criteria for evaluation that could be shared with their opponents; 
they aim, instead, to demonize what they see as unacceptable practices.49 
Humphrey and Stears consider various explanations for the employment of the exaggeration 
of moral disagreement, but the most compelling is that polarising rhetoric is used primarily 
for the entailing shock factor. They point out that comparisons between the Holocaust and 
factory farming µforces people to think about livestock farming in a way they never would 
have before if they had not been presented with this image¶50 Polarising rhetoric like this is 
also similar to cost-levying; a sort of µconscience-levying¶ in its implication of audience 
complicity: are you one of us, or one of them? In responding to footage of horrific conditions 
in factory farms for example, the audience becomes either the potential saviour of animals (if 
they accept the message and stop buying factory farmed products) or the demonised abuser 
(if they ignore the message and continue to buy factory farmed products). The onus is on the 
viewer as to which side they wish to take; there is no in-between. 
The exaggeration of moral disagreement certainly appears to be more overtly persuasive in 
nature than some cost-levying activities. It still falls far short of deliberative ideals since it 
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does not seek to engage in meaningful argument with interlocutors, but to demonise and 
antagonise adversaries. The use of controversial comparisons does not constitute reason-
based argument, but a stark moral position presented for an audience to identify with or 
otherwise. Nonetheless Humphrey and Stears remain adamant that exaggeration of moral 
disagreement LVVWLOOFDUULHGRXWZLWKWKHLQWHQWLRQRIµMROWLQJ¶SHRSOHRXWRI WKHLUµFRJQLWLYH
VWLFNLQHVV¶ ± the frames of reference within which the status quo sit, outside of which lies 
radical animal rights philosophy.51 Hadley questions this intention when he points out that 
some animal activists participate in non-deliberative actions directly to save animals.  
In what follows, I suggest that the exaggeration of moral disagreement ± considering video 
activism as an example ± may not have the reflexive clout that Humphrey and Stears claim 
but that it can have finite deliberative potential in the deliberative system.  
Reflexivity and risk: graphic imagery and moral shocks in the deliberative system 
Images of animal suffering have long been a stalwart of activists but in recent years social 
media, video sharing sites and digital activism have given rise to a proliferation of photos and 
video activism ± from shaky amateur undercover footage to slick, sculpted campaigns 
produced by major animal protection organisations. Such videos often fall into one or both of 
two categories: graphic imagery of animal abuse and suffering, or moral shock videos. Moral 
shock videos often draw analogies between animal and human suffering and rely on µHPRWLRQ
ZRUN¶DV$GDP%URZQDQGDeirdre Quinn-Allan describe it: the weaving of an affective story 
that is designed to elicit an emotional shock to the audience and subsequently initiate a 
behavioural change. 52 
From both a deliberative and animal protection perspective, we need to ask whether moral 
shock or graphic videos have the desired effect. In the language of deliberative systems, are 
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they consequential ± do they prompt reflection, and consequently impact on behaviour or 
decisions? Brown and Quinn-Allan question the potential benefits of graphic footage, 
FRQWHQGLQJ WKDW µthe overuse of graphic footage of animal cruelty might distance broad 
publics from debates on animal welfare rather WKDQLQVSLUHVXSSRUWDQGDFWLRQ¶.53 They base 
their contention primarily on two strands of argument that are (albeit unintentionally) close to 
the deliberative democratic position: firstly, that demonising people who do bad things to 
animals excludes important stakeholders from any meaningful dialogue. Such demonisation 
risks further alienating those whom animal advocates ultimately need to persuade if a 
substantive structural change in animal industries is to occur. 
The propagation of moral distance between activists and people who do bad things to animals 
is indicative of the broader manner in which much of the animal protection movement 
operates: generally the intended audience is the public, based on the assumption that the 
public are reasonable and amenable to animal protection messages. 54 Animal industries are 
more often than not the target of disruptive cost-levying activities - they are seen as 
unreasonable and unresponsive to reasoned argument. Interestingly, Brown and Quinn-Allan 
suggest evidence of contraryWKDWµaudiences involved in animal farming and allied industries 
may be persuaded through a more prominent use of rational message appeals¶.55 It is possible 
that an over-reliance on the exaggeration of moral disagreement and cost-levying without 
recourse to sufficient reason-based arguments actually undermines the persuasive potential of 
animal activists. Through demonising and antagonising their adversaries, animal activists 
give those in power more of an excuse not to take their demands seriously. Moreover, these 
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tactics draw attention away from the substantive argument DQGµUDWLRQDOLVWLFEDVLVRIDQLPDO
ULJKWVSKLORVRSK\¶.56 
Even if the broader public are the best target audience for animal activists, Brown and Quinn-
$OODQ¶VVHFRQGFDXWLRQDJDLQVWWKHRYHUXVHRIJUDSKLFLPDJHU\OLHVLQLWVSRWHQWLDOWRalienate 
the public. In their analysis of YouTube video activism on puppy farming they argue that a 
proliferation of µPRUDOVKRFN¶ footage runs the risk of desensitising broader publics to images 
of suffering and lessens the impact of emotive intent.57 However, a study of the animal rights 
movement in Sweden, notes WKDW  µactivists try to mitigate the possible negative effects of 
using moral shocks, by combining them with providing positive information about what can 
be doQHFRQFUHWHO\WRDFKLHYHFKDQJH¶.58 The positive action of reaching out to the audience 
could be seen as harbouring some deliberative potential. Although hardly an economy of 
moral disagreement, it could be construed an attempt to reach a mutually acceptable outcome. 
The caveat is that the desired outcome is only mutually acceptable if the audience chooses to 
join the activist, with no such commitment on the part of the activist to modify their own 
position. Furthermore, the exaggeration of moral disagreement remains implicit in the call to 
action: asking an audience to µMRLQXV¶ LPSOLHVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIµWKHP¶ZKRDUHQRWZLWKµXV¶
reinforcing the moral binary. 
If the exaggeration of moral disagreement is possibly ineffective in providing the cognitive 
jolt that Humphrey and Stears argue for, does it have any deliberative potential from a 
systemic viewpoint? As with cost-levying, the exaggeration of moral disagreement or 
polarising rhetoric may contribute to inclusivity through bringing animal suffering into  
public consciousness; such videos are likely to spark debate in public space due to their 
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controversial nature. Beyond inclusivity however, I suggest that exaggeration of moral 
disagreement may harbour further, but finite, deliberative potential 
Exaggeration of moral disagreement in the Deliberative System 
The use of rhetoric, according to Humphrey and Stears, is excluded by strict deliberative 
ideals as it falls outside the realm of purely rational argument. However, deliberative theorists 
have argued for its inclusion on the basis that marginalised groups may rely on rhetoric to 
communicate their messages but it is only when deliberation is analysed on a systemic level 
that we can see how polarising rhetoric contributes to overall deliberative capacity. 
The polarising rhetoric symptomatic of enclave deliberation is often fostered in 
communication between activists. Mansbridge has argued that this sort of communication ± 
in crude terPV µYHJDQV WDONLQJ WR YHJDQV¶ ± is vital for marginalised activist groups to 
develop and sharpen their messages: 
Working and talking together in an atmosphere of sustained commitment and 
sometimes quite unrealistic hope, organized activists dream up a cornucopia of 
new ideas, words, songs, symbols and other cultural products.59  
Creative potency is further enhanced by the fact that typically, activists in an organised 
PRYHPHQWLQWHUDFWSULPDULO\ZLWKHDFKRWKHULQµIUHHVSDFHV¶ZKHUHSDUWLFXODUGLVFRXUVHVFDQ
develop in a protected space.60 The deliberative democratic benefits of enclave deliberation 
are necessarily finite because at some point ideas and discourses must be exposed to 
contestation and broader debate. However, the generation of discourses in protected enclaves 
gives marginalised groups a chance to refine their arguments before they are exposed to the 
wider world. Sunstein warns against the dangers of enclave deliberation, arguing that that 
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communication between like-minded activists can lead to the adoption of extreme polarising 
positions that are far away from the deliberative ideal of attempting to accommodate 
opposing views in argument. 61  This is particularly apparent in online spaces where 
µLQGLYLGXDOV JUDYLWDWH WR HQFODYHV ZKHUH WKHLU YLHZV FDQ EH UHLQIRUFHG DQG GULYHQ WR
H[WUHPHV¶.62 Such polarised expressions may contribute to alienation of broader publics; this 
danger is particularly pertinent for animal activists in a climate where animal rights activism 
is securitised and construed as a terrorist-like activity.63  
The benefits of enclave deliberation are most potent in helping to strengthen a marginal 
discourse like animal rights philosophy. Once exposed to contestation in public space or 
transmitting messages to policymakers, the exaggeration of moral disagreement could serve 
to undermine and jeopardise the desired outcome through its demonisation of antagonists and 
alienation of audiences. Chambers has argued that dramatising rhetoric is deliberatively 
admissible if it provokes an audience to reflect on their own position and encourages them to 
see things from a different perspective as Humphrey and Stears suggest that exaggeration of 
moral disagreement does. 64  However, although the substantive claims of animal rights 
UKHWRULFPD\IXOILO&KDPEHUV¶FULWHULRQDFWLYLVWVRXJKWWREHUHIOH[LYHLQFRQVLGHULQJWKHZD\
in which they present their arguments. How claims and ideas are presented matters as much 
as the substantive content of the claim itself, and this should matter to animal activists as 
much as it matters to deliberative democrats - if they want to influence decision-makers. An 
over-reliance on polarising rhetoric may result in alienation that outweighs any reflective 
benefits. Activists should take this into consideration in constructing campaigns aimed at 
either the broader public or policymakers.  
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Cost-levying must be approached with the same caution: using graphic images of animal 
suffering may impose too great a psychological cost for the viewer to handle; Brown and 
Quinn-Allan suggest that some animal activist videos have a high attrition rate for this very 
reason. Moreover, the nature of online media means that an audience can very easily choose 
to stop watching something WKDW WKH\ GRQ¶W OLNH 7KHUHIRUH as Ercan, Hendriks and Dryzek 
point out,  
Simply including more voices and meanings into the system does little if there 
are blockages LQWKHGHOLEHUDWLYHV\VWHPRULIWKHV\VWHPKDVDNLQGRIµDWWHQWLRQ
GHILFLW¶ WKDW SUHFOXGHV WKH LQWHUDFWLRQ DQG WUDQVPLVVLRQ DFURVV GLIIHUHQW VLWHV
and thus hinders the rearrangement of democratic possibilities.65  
In other words, the quantifiable reach of video activism is not necessarily a catalyst for 
authentic deliberation or the cognitive jolt necessary to persuade an audience of the animal 
DFWLYLVW¶V ZD\ RI WKLQNLQJ Activists should consider utilising more deliberative approaches 
that may be more conducive to their aims when transmitting messages to persuade broader 
publics and decision-makers.  
Conclusion 
Here I have outlined a systemic approach to deliberative democracy with the aim of lending 
some evaluative clarity to the implications of admitting non-deliberative actions. Deliberative 
Systems is a valuable evaluative framework for empirical analysis, and provides a cohesive 
normative account of deliberative democracy that permits non-deliberative actions in 
response to initially non-deliberative conditions. As the deliberative system demands the 
disaggregation of various sites of communication, so we must disaggregate the 
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interdependent criteria of inclusivity, authenticity and consequentiality to evaluate animal 
activism through this prism.  
I agreed with Humphrey and Stears that cost-levying activities can enhance political equality 
through helping marginalised groups attract attention in public and political agendas. Instead 
of considering just activists though, we ought to consider the democratic credentials of 
animals themselves under the all-affected principle. Animals are the ultimate marginalised 
group in society and therefore, high-profile cost-levying activities contribute to inclusivity in 
the deliberative system  through the representation of animal suffering.   
Caution is needed with regards the use of non-deliberative tactics for the simple reasons that 
they may not always contribute to deliberative capacity but most importantly, that such 
tactics may not help animal activists get any closer to their own goals. Though graphic 
imagery enhances the political representation of animals, its reflexive potential is limited by 
WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDOLHQDWLQJEURDGHUSXEOLFVDQG µPD\QRWQHFHVVDULOy deepen the quality of 
these conversations¶.66  In other words, whilst disruptive activities contribute to inclusive 
deliberation in public space, authentic deliberation requires substantively more than cost-
levying or moral exaggeration to persuade broader publics and decision-makers of the claims 
of animal rights philosophy. Cost-levying and moral exaggeration may be necessary 
ingredients, but are not sufficient for prompting the authentic deliberation needed to give 
serious consideration to the demands of animal rights. Both tactics can contribute to a more 
inclusive public debate, but the visceral reactions that they tend to produce are not conducive 
WR WKHµVORZWKLQNLQJ¶ WKDW LVQHFHVVDU\ IRU UHIOection in a deliberative sense.67 Furthermore, 
there is empirical evidence to suggest that the coercive activities employed some animal 
activists are ineffective. One study found that those involved in animal use and disinterested 
                                                          
66
 Ibid: 20. 
67
 Kahneman 2013, cited in Ercan, Hendriks and Dryzek 2015: 14. 
24 
 
members of the public were less sensitive to the visceral disgust reaction that graphic imagery 
of animal suffering is often intended to invoke. Conversely, animal activists were found to be 
more sensitive to visceral disgust.68 The reasons for this are not clear, but it does indicate that 
such tactics may be ineffective in persuading. Even some animal activists themselves 
recognise that disruptive cost-levying activities, though morally justifiable, are politically 
ineffective.69 What is now required is empirical analysis from a deliberative perspective.   
Humphrey and Stears quite rightly point out that animal activists are primarily committed to 
their cause, and not to deliberative democratic ideals.70 They go astray when they imply that 
the two are mutually exclusive. Instead, standard recourses like cost-levying and moral 
exaggeration may actually be counterproductive in instigating the  authentic deliberation that 
animal rights philosophy demands ± the reflexivity, the equal consideration of alternative 
perspectives and embodiment of the all-affected principle. A more deliberative approach 
encompassing reasoned argument and non-coercive persuasion may be more conducive to 
DFKLHYLQJDQLPDODFWLYLVWV¶DLPV7KLVLVQRWWRVD\WKDWWKHOLNHVRIJUDSKLFLPDJHU\RUPRUDO
shocks should be done away with altogether. Instead, activists should adopt a more nuanced, 
reflexive approach in deciding how they transmit their messages, and to whom. A successful 
transmission mechanism in the deliberative system is one which successfully conducts and 
relays a public discourse to decision-makers in empowered space. Successful transmission of 
an animal rights discourse enhances the possibility of it having any impact on actual policy. 
Without successful connective tissue, animal rights activism runs the risk of remaining 
marginalised, prolific in public space and highly visible, but ultimately powerless.  
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